I too am curious what the next administration will do from a policy perspective to correct some of the household income inequality. Coming out of COVID-19, the next administration is going to have their hands full with the state of the country they inherited. I am curious to see what they will do in order to ensure a more economically secure citizenry.

This document is interesting to me. I noticed there was no mention of any sort of setback due to financial crimes. I acknowledge this is from an economic perspective, examining historical data compared to today on the grounds of economic security. I however, would be interested to see statistics on the amount of US families who are a risk of losing their economic security due to financial crime. While my main domain is cyberspace, I understand that financial crimes can cost a family their livelihood. This data would have been interesting to see included in this article. The historical analysis included in the article interests me. I noticed that the current state of economic security is vastly different than it was 40 + years ago. I am interested to see how this trend continues in this analysis. I agree that household income inequality has shifted. I have observed this when comparing my peers to my grandparents and noticing the differences. I am however interested by the fact that debt accumulated is a key factor for the ‘young adults.’ I do believe that the rising debt of American citizens needs to be examined from a government standpoint. I found this article interesting and I look forward to more seeing more research on the topic.

The strategic approach expressed in this document is interesting. I of course am drawn to the section, albeit brief, on cyberspace. I agree that being as capable in cyberspace as land, sea, or air is a good guiding principle. I am interested to see how this dedication folds out for the US. As the document would imply, the fighting seems to be more offensive than defensive. The role of offensive operations in cyberspace are important, but defensive operations are equally as important. Seeing as this document is two years old, I am curious to see how future documents will address cyberspace. With a presidential transition on the horizon, I hopeful that cyber operations will be a focus in a future strategy. I do look forward to reading the next national security strategy and focusing on the sections of cyberspace and cybersecurity.

Today’s document and topic are interesting. USAID is an interesting organization and mission put forth by the US government. I am familiar with some of the work USAID has done in the past. The education and prosperity programs offered by USAID in Africa are projects I am familiar with. Having the opportunity, I went and read the ‘where we work’ page on the USAID site. I was surprised to see the amount of diverse regions the USAID as operations in. Interesting and effective operations aside, I am not surprised to see the US government re-examining the program in this manner. I am curious to see what comes out of this re-examination. I do believe that the mission of USAID is a noble one. I look forward to seeing what operations USAID embarks on in the future.

Seeing an internal audit of this scale is interesting to me. This document includes multiple different organizations in their audit of the chief management office. Something that stood out to me is that the audit did not mention anything involving cybersecurity. Since this is a longitudinal analysis of the CMO since 2008, I was under the impression that something in cyberspace would be relevant enough for this report. I am not the most familiar with inner-government audits that are over cyber resilience. However, I found some interesting information here. The quote, “Since its establishment in 2008, the Office of the CMO (OCMO) has failed to deliver the level of department-wide business transformation envisioned in the legislation, nor met the expectations of multiple SD, DSD, other senior officials or the Congressional defense leadership.” Reading this provides a clear picture of the current state of the office. I am wondering why the failures are now being reported in 2020 and not at a sooner time. I, however, was not familiar with this office prior to reading this document. I am now wondering how prevalent this problem is in other areas of government. If this entire office failed their goal, it is plausible other areas have similar and underreported issues.

This is a very topical discussion for today. I have spent a lot of time in my undergrad looking into democratic systems present today. From a psychological perspective I am always curious of the different social responses people and groups have to different infringements on their democratic rights. I recall the recent protests in Puerto Rica where protestors carried a guillotine through the streets towards the Governor’s house [1]. The recent Hong Kong protests also come to mind. The Hong Kong protests are an interesting case study when it comes to protests against a regime. I could however talk about Hong Kong for a long time. The included document is interesting as the UN is dedicated to democracy. Having the UN support elections on a global scale bolsters democracy. The video addressed the goals of the UN when it comes to elections. Their assistance is interesting as I would have appreciated them using more case studies in how the UN accomplished their goals within an election. [1]. Puerto Rico protests https://www.vice.com/en/article/7kz8ja/puerto-rican-protesters-want-their-governor-to-resign-again

This document starts off strong with the direct acknowledgement of the threat China poses to the US. However, my attention was drawn to section IV. Development of AI and quantum computing will provide an advantage to the US. Quantum computing is a debate with some aware of the threat quantum computing poses from an offensive standpoint [1]. For example, quantum computing poses a significant risk to Blockchain [2]. Development of this hard power would allow the US a significant advantage in cyberspace. However, all advantages are subjected to potential erosion. Foreign powers will seek out the secrets of the US quantum computing should this be developed. Quantum computing deployed in cyberspace would alter the battlefields of the next conflict. Quantum computing does however still have a ways to go before it is an offensive power. Like quantum computing, artificial intelligence is not at a point to an offensive power however the application is there. In 2019 the OpenAI managed to beat the world’s champions team at Dota 2 eSports [3]. This may just be an eSports victory to some however using this technology to power and operate drone technologies changes the role of future warfare. Having an artificial intelligence operate drone strikes would provide a significant advantage to the US military. These emerging concepts as referenced in the article are important for the government to keep a hand in. Threat of Quantum Computing https://securityboulevard.com/2020/08/quantum-computing-and-the-evolving-cybersecurity-threat/ Quantum Computing and Blockchain https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/publications/17-4039-blockchain-and-quantum-computing.pdf OpenAI Five beats OG https://www.vox.com/2019/4/13/18309418/open-ai-dota-triumph-og

I am curious how the NRO will be interacting with the missile defense system SoaceX is developing on a DOD contract. You mentioned that NRO is responsible for technology more advanced than the DOD. To my knowledge the new defense system will be heavily reliant on satellites for detection of ballistic missiles. I have to imagine with the NRO having such a vital role in intelligence collection will have a role in this new system.

I am admittivity not the most familiar with the National Reconnaissance Office. This document interests me as satellite-based intelligence is not a domain I research often. I am aware that the NRO and similar organizations need a robust cyber defense policy to ensure protection of their intelligence. Satellite intelligence and anything involving space imagery needs to be protected in cyberspace. I would be interested to see the security operations center and what their case log is like. The second to final paragraph details the importance of denying access to and hardening their operations. I am curious to see how the organization’s goals are supported by the technological and human protections in place. The operating environment of the NRO interests me. With the focus on space power and the growth of the Space Force, I am curious how the NRO will adapt to future challenges. The NRO appears to be closely tied to the DOD in their operations. I am curious how the NRO and the Space Force will interact in terms of functions and budgets.

The 2016 election is an interesting case study for cybersecurity. Russia has attempted to interfere with multiple elections through actions in cyberspace. The recent French presidential election comes to mind. Russian intelligence operatives are attributed with spreading disinformation and aggressive cyber actions to influence the elections [1]. The growth of division between US citizens as a goal for the Russian intelligence operatives is interesting to me. Their actions in cyberspace have supported this goal. I remember multiple online profiles that were vocal in support of a specific candidate being geo-located to Russa during the 2016 election. What really interests me is what the US is going to do with this information. The report details critical vulnerabilities in the voting infrastructure. I certainly believe DHS and the NSA will ensure these known vulnerabilities are patched. I however do hope that both organizations are running penetration tests on the voting collection and storage assets to understand and correct potential vulnerabilities. During the 2020 election season, state-sponsored hackers from China have been found targeting the Biden campaign with credential harvesting attacks [2]. Russia and China seem to have similar goals when it comes to the US election this year. Foreign interference in US democracy poses a major issue to the US political system. The last section interests me as it addresses the threat environment with a call to action. “Our adversaries will persist in their efforts to undermine our shared democratic values. In order to ensure that our democracy endures, it is imperative that we recognize the threat and make the investments necessary to withstand the next attack.” Russia and the French Election https://www.politico.eu/article/france-election-2017-russia-hacked-cyberattacks/ Chinese Hackers Target Biden Campaign https://blog.google/threat-analysis-group/how-were-tackling-evolving-online-threats

@Madeline Smith Blueleaks is an interesting case study. Local police departments are commonly targeted with phishing attacks as they hold valuable PII on both the employees and the citizens they interact with from a legal perspective. I would not be surprised if forums and online sites designed for police officers were targeted at an increased rate during the summer protests. As for the recent attack, I am curious to see what Anonymous will do with the stolen data in the future. I am sure there are multiple entities with deep pockets interested in the data. My main concern for cyber-attacks towards law enforcement is when threat actors begin attacking with the intent to gain access to police hardware. Law Enforcement agencies have been known to purchase expensive hardware with unique purposes such as Stringray designed to mimic a cellphone tower providing the agents with a way to collect phone-calls from the area of deployment. What damage could be done if threat actors gain access to the stingray itself or to the data storage of the calls. For the purpose of general education on Stingray Phone Trackers I have included the Wikipedia page below. The same could be said for shooter/gunfire detection systems or facial recognition systems. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stingray_phone_tracker

The topic of cyber espionage is something I have spent a lot of time researching in my academic career. The role of cyber-espionage eroding US military and economic power is a issue affecting the entire field of cybersecurity. The most prominent example is the data breach caused by Chinese hackers that resulted in the plans for the F-35 being stolen [1]. This breach removed a strategic military advantage from the US. This document has a focus on the role of competitive advantages being manipulated by cyberspace. I believe the document articulates the role of cyber-espionage well, “Despite advances in cybersecurity, cyber espionage continues to offer threat actors a relatively low-cost, high-yield avenue of approach to a wide spectrum of intellectual property.” Just this week the US has indicted six Russian intelligence operatives (GRU employees) for their alleged role in multiple cyber campaigns [2]. Russia will continue their operations in cyberspace regardless of the attributions against them. China operates in a similar vein. The DOD has unmasked and filed multiple indictments against members of the People’s Liberation Army for cyber-crimes, but the actions continue. Cyber-espionage will continue to be a major issue facing US and Western power. The offensive operations countries like China and Russia are able to prey of the US advantages. Protection for the US will be extremely difficult when there are still private companies falling victim to MEOW attacks via unsecured databases of customer information [3]. The role and acceptance of cloud networks private companies handling US data has presented multiple different avenues of attack for US opponents. Two recent cases of cyber-attacks targeting US firms related to the government are the breaches impacting IPG Photonics, lead laser developer and US government software provider Tyler Technologies [4] [5]. I believe we will hear more about these breaches impacting US advantages in due time. An important quote from this document accurately details the threat environment the US faces in cyber from a political perspective, “We anticipate that China, Russia, and Iran will remain aggressive and capable collectors of sensitive U.S. economic information and technologies, particularly in cyberspace.” It is important to note that private cyber criminals also pose a threat to US advantages. I have included sources below for additional reading. 1. F-35 Plans https://www.idga.org/archived-content/news/pentagon-admits-f-35-data-theft-is-a-major-problem 2. US Indictment of six Russian Nationals of Cybercrime https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-charges-six-russian-intelligence-officers-with-hacking-11603126931 3. Meow Attack https://blog.qualys.com/product-tech/2020/08/26/meow-attack-a-reminder-for-organizations-to-identify-and-secure-their-databases 4. IPG Photonics https://www.databreaches.net/leading-u-s-laser-developer-ipg-photonics-hit-with-ransomware/ 5. Tyler Technologies https://krebsonsecurity.com/2020/09/govt-services-firm-tyler-technologies-hit-in-apparent-ransomware-attack/

This pillar of the national security strategy was interesting. A small section of the document references religious freedom. Throughout this section references to religion is made multiple times through the usage of phrases such as, "a gift of God". I found this interesting. There are other references to religion in this government document. Earlier, concepts are listed as God-given rights. I find this interesting as the themes of secularism appear to be heavily blurred here. The notion of religious freedom appears to be more to choose between religions, something not every one has, and not choose to even be religious in the first place. This interests me. I will be keeping an eye out for religious language in this document. However, I was drawn to the section on keeping an open and free internet. I do not believe the US has done all that they could to support this priority. Ajit Pai and the net neutrality repeal went against the national security strategy. I do not believe we can prioritize an open and free internet if we ourselves are willing to repeal Net Neutrality. I do not believe that this action by the government is in support of the open and free internet. I believe without net neutrality we will see more predatory behaviors by internet service providers.

Pillar three proved to be an interesting read. Preserving peace through strength is an admirable goal for a state to strive for. I noticed that in the beginning of the document there is a strong theme of us vs them. There is a specific notion that it is the US vs its competitors with support of allies. I found this interesting as these competitors are directly named and their threat to US prosperity identified. I was however drawn to the sections of Space and Cyberspace. I have always enjoyed learning about outer space. I am glad that the US government is focused on outer space. The role of satellites is crucial to a lot of US operations. I have noticed that cybersecurity and cyberspace are referenced a lot in this document as a whole. There have been multiple references to cyberspace in all three pillars so far. The role of identifying foreign nations that use their Cybercraft to project influence is a large part of threat intelligence. One thing that stuck out to me is the priority action of improving attribution, accountability, and response. Making attributions towards cybercrimes is not an easy task. Making attributions is a strategic choice. DOJ made the indictment against the four Chinese hackers as a part of their attributions towards China for the Equifax breach. The same can be said for the Lockheed Martin breach that resulted in the F-35 plans being stolen. The importance of a rapid response is stated in this pillar. However, the type and level of response are not mentioned. I find myself still curious if the current administration would be willing to use a kinetic response to a cyber-attack. However, the US has yet to resort to kinetic means as a response to Cybercraft. The priority action of enhancing cyber tools and expertise ties in with pillar two. Leading innovation in the cyber capabilities of the US requires research and development in part with the private sector. I do believe these pillars are heavily related in that manner. I look forward to reading pillar four.

With pillar two I was drawn to the section of, "Lead in Research, Technology Invention, and Innovation". I firmly believe that technology lends itself as a strong advantage to the United States. This has been witnessed throughout history. I am pleased to see that the current administration understands the importance of research and innovation. I found the priority actions to be of interest. Leveraging capital and expertise is something that I believe the United States is able to do well. The government partnership with the private sector in the area of research is crucial. Companies like Lockheed Martin help maintain the technological advantage the United States' military holds onto. One observation I made however is that a large portion of this document discusses spending in hopes for future gains. Funding research and innovation is in the hope of having new advantages. This view of spending bleeds into the energy sector towards the end of this document. Protecting the global energy infrastructure is not cheap. The goal of ensuring energy security appears to be a costly goal. I found these focuses and goals to be interesting as they predominant focus on how to spend the gains gathered from other sections of this pillar.

I enjoyed reading through this document. Admittedly my eyes were drawn to the sections on cyber security. I appreciate the focus on keeping America safe in the era of cyber. “The government must do a better job of protecting data to safeguard information and the privacy of the American people”. I agree with this statement. Cyber security is an uphill battle for governments and increasing protections helps level the field. The document illustrates the need for government and private sector partnership to achieve this goal. In response there has been an expansion of Air Force Civilian careers in cyber and partnerships with private companies. Since the document was published in 2017 is it interesting to think about the recent developments and events in cyber after this document was posted. The indictment of four Chinese nation state hackers by the DOJ comes to mind. The individuals attributed with the Equifax breach have been identified and indictments followed. Another note that stood out is the inclusion of improving information sharing and sensing. This is something that occurred more than once in the previous administrator. The U.S. China cyber agreement of 2015 was a link between U.S. and China for information sharing regarding to cyber space. The current national security strategy outlines the swift consequences for malicious actors in cyber space. The vagueness of swift consequences interests me. I recall the recent drone strike on Hamas hackers in Palestine by the Israeli military. This document makes me wonder if kinetic responses are on the table for U.S. reactions to cyber attacks. Cyber is considered a battlefield according to NATO. I am excited to read the upcoming security strategy and see the changes to cybersecurity. For more about the events I’ve referenced: Chinese Hackers Indicted https://www.wired.com/story/equifax-hack-china/#:~:text=In%20a%20sweeping%20nine-count%20indictment%2C%20the%20DOJ%20alleged,state-sponsored%20thefts%20of%20personally%20identifiable%20information%20on%20record. U.S. China Cyber Agreement (2015) https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IN10376.pdf#:~:text=S.-China%20Cyber%20Agreement%20During%20the%20state%20visit%20on,States%20and%20China%20agreed%2C%20among%20other%20things%2C%20to Hamas Hackers Target of Drone Strike https://www.zdnet.com/article/in-a-first-israel-responds-to-hamas-hackers-with-an-air-strike/