Intelligence Community

Reading about the National reconnaissance office today was interesting. Starting at the conceptualization and need for the office during the threat of the Soviet Union to today’s need for intelligence for military operations is fascinating to research. In short, the NRO collects data, analyzes, and then passes that data along to partners that request it. It was interesting to learn that until 1992, the existence of the NRO was classified and even its name was not officially acknowledged by the government in comparison to today, where the existence of the NRO is openly acknowledged and several aspects of its activities have been declassified. The NRO develops, acquires, and operates the most sensitive space reconnaissance satellite systems that collect imagery intelligence (IMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), and measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) which is of great value to the government and is now available to a wide variety of users in many government agencies. I think that the progression of new and emerging technologies will constantly put a strain on NRO personnel due to the ever-evolving world of technology. It seems that in a matter of a year technology is already out of date and a newer version is available. It is for that reason I completely agree that with the newly created Space Force the NRO has an important mission to stay on top of the “leap ahead” and “revolutionary” technologies, especially in the space reconnaissance effort so operations have the most current data to help things go smoother in missions. That leads me to my last thought. The transference of some NRO activities and operations to the Department of Defense makes sense to me. The NRO can focus on developing unique space-based collection systems to solve difficult intelligence problems while DoD can be responsible for developing and operating those space systems because they know how t use technology so that military commander needs are better satisfied. It would also make sense to transfer the experts in those systems and satellites under the DoD umbrella because NRO satellites are substantially more complex than DoD satellites.

I am admittivity not the most familiar with the National Reconnaissance Office. This document interests me as satellite-based intelligence is not a domain I research often. I am aware that the NRO and similar organizations need a robust cyber defense policy to ensure protection of their intelligence. Satellite intelligence and anything involving space imagery needs to be protected in cyberspace. I would be interested to see the security operations center and what their case log is like. The second to final paragraph details the importance of denying access to and hardening their operations. I am curious to see how the organization’s goals are supported by the technological and human protections in place. The operating environment of the NRO interests me. With the focus on space power and the growth of the Space Force, I am curious how the NRO will adapt to future challenges. The NRO appears to be closely tied to the DOD in their operations. I am curious how the NRO and the Space Force will interact in terms of functions and budgets.

I had little familiarity with the NRO before reading this document, so this was very insightful. Having an organization dedicated to constructing satellite infrastructure is vital, especially as we increasingly rely on them for security purposes and everyday tasks alike. Satellites also serve as incredibly an incredibly important intelligence role. As an example, satellite photos were key in discovering the extent of concentration camps in Northwestern China. We rely on satellites a lot, and it is important that we have an organization dedicated to this task. So that other intelligence agencies, such as the National Security Agency or the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, can effectively collect intelligence and protect national security.

But what I found the be the most interesting aspect of the NRO strategy is how this strategic document seemed like it spent a lot of time outlining internal threats to its influence on US foreign policy. For example, this line "However, such activities have tended to divert the NRO's attention from what it is best suited to do: design, acquire and launch reconnaissance satellites that can help resolve the most difficult intelligence collection problems," or this line, "The Commission believes transfers of SIGINT and IMINT responsibilities from the NRO to NSA and NIMA could be destructive of U.S. capabilities to collect intelligence from space in the long run" both do not address a policy issue, but an organizational one. It also demanded that organizations, like the CIA and the DoD, better define their role. It also complained about its lack of influence within US foreign policy, claiming, "Finally, and most, unfortunately, the NRO no longer commands the personal attention of the President, the Secretary of Defense, the DCI, or senior White House officials with regard to its technology and system acquisition decisions." This is a very different structure and tone than some of the previous organizational strategies I have reviewed. The Space Force Strategy did not spend much time defining its roles in comparison to other organizations or specifically arguing over which agency was responsible for a specific task. It mostly spoke in broad strokes.

The document is an interesting mix between advocating for the capabilities of the organization, stressing the need for a more specific role in the intelligence community, and criticizing other organizations for not assisting the NRO enough. While this all may be true, I was expecting more of a focus on the external challenges the organization faced, not the internal. Though I suppose it is good that this document spent so much time reviewing the NRO's role in relation to other intelligence agencies, as it is important to establish solid roles so that they can all cooperate to develop accurate and relevant intelligence.

I find this document to be one of the more insightful strategies we have looked at thus far. Especially when considering that the purpose of many of these documents is to help Congress and other policymakers defined budgets for these organizations. This document seemed to take a more overt approach to accomplish this than some of the previous ones we have looked at.

The National Reconnaissance Office is an organization that develops technology and collects intelligence from space. The systems they are responsible for are more advanced than even the Department of Defense. One specific new piece of technology that they hope to use as the next breakthrough in intelligence is called Sentient. This intelligence analysis system is being developed to meet four goals; data ingest and processing, sense-making, orchestrated collection, and framework, and human/ machine interface. The engineers are implementing machine learning in the hopes that this program will allow analysts to spend less time searching for and collecting data, and more time on analysis and digestion of the information found. Very little concrete information is being shared about this project, but it is regarded as the future of military technology.

Historically, this organization has used satellites to collect information on the Soviet Union in the cold war. A program called Corona was the United States' first photo-reconnaissance satellite and was operational from 1960-1972 and declassified in 1995. This satellite could take pictures of things as small as a car in a Soviet field and was used to monitor the nuclear developments of the Soviets in the Arctic. There is a very interesting documentary made by PBS called Astrospies that takes about this program.