This week's readings will focus on the most recent US national strategy for countering foreign terrorism as well as delve into domestic sources of terrorism.
Please offer your perspectives on each document throughout the week.
Seeing footnote A in the CVE Task Force Reference Aid acts like the fine print with the devil in the details. It's interesting to note that there exists a government definition for domestic terrorism, and has extra punishments for it, yet didn't designate any organization as one nor have existant punishments independent of other crimes. It makes you wonder if the term "terrorism" really only applies to foreigners and can conflate those sentiments in an insidious xenophobic way. It is also curious that the footnote mentions domestic terrorism giving enhanced sentences connected to other crimes, meaning it can't be stood alone. I have a minor hunch that the number of attacks between 2000 and 2016 is too low and may be underreported, or there are more since 2016 considering the past year of racial tensions. The Asian American community has had an uptick in attacks since the pandemic started and been underreported for instance. Also being pushed and punched spontaneously sort of undermines the "not premeditated" part, so I wonder where bare-handed attacks rank. I also wonder how the social media trend for WSEs will go now that the private sector is finally taking steps to address this issue. That progress started off from Election season flagging Trump's and others' potential misinformation and disinformation, then escalating into account bans from the Capitol Hill riots. Going back to yesterday's document, they'll probably become even sneaker as "ghost skins". China and Kazakhstan also reflect a similar parallel with the US strategy of limiting communications with foreign extremists with the Internet, in which China suspects the Uighurs of doing so with those in Kazakhstan. This probably adds on to the use of social media being restricted for Uighurs to talk to their families and friends abroad.
Seeing footnote A in the CVE Task Force Reference Aid acts like the fine print with the devil in the details. It's interesting to note that there exists a government definition for domestic terrorism, and has extra punishments for it, yet didn't designate any organization as one nor have existant punishments independent of other crimes. It makes you wonder if the term "terrorism" really only applies to foreigners and can conflate those sentiments in an insidious xenophobic way. It is also curious that the footnote mentions domestic terrorism giving enhanced sentences connected to other crimes, meaning it can't be stood alone. I have a minor hunch that the number of attacks between 2000 and 2016 is too low and may be underreported, or there are more since 2016 considering the past year of racial tensions. The Asian American community has had an uptick in attacks since the pandemic started and been underreported for instance. Also being pushed and punched spontaneously sort of undermines the "not premeditated" part, so I wonder where bare-handed attacks rank. I also wonder how the social media trend for WSEs will go now that the private sector is finally taking steps to address this issue. That progress started off from Election season flagging Trump's and others' potential misinformation and disinformation, then escalating into account bans from the Capitol Hill riots. Going back to yesterday's document, they'll probably become even sneaker as "ghost skins". China and Kazakhstan also reflect a similar parallel with the US strategy of limiting communications with foreign extremists with the Internet, in which China suspects the Uighurs of doing so with those in Kazakhstan. This probably adds on to the use of social media being restricted for Uighurs to talk to their families and friends abroad.