Sub-regional European Entities

CSTO is a security alliance successor to Warsaw Pact. The way I see it, Russia has concerns with terrorism, and so does China in a way. Since CSTO includes Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, etc., these are some of the same states that is part of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) that links Eurasia together. China has a nexus in security matters here for shared security concerns, and they could possibly branch out beyond terrorism for other political and security matters against the West. Article 4 is interesting to note an emphasis on democracy considering its authoritative members. This article is also probably what makes cooperation with China and others possible. Article 5 seems to be similar to ASEAN's non-interference. Article 7 & 8 seems to be functioning for infrastructure when the US helped out surrounding states around Russia with transporting and securing their nuclear materials back to Russia in the 90s. They sent lots of aid money to locate those nuclear materials, special transport trucks, and adequate storage facilities. My question is if China does BRI activity with them under Article 7, despite it stating a military focus. BRI does help with infrastructure after all, and some ports are dual-purposed with Chinese navy currently in other partner states. Article 13 and subsequent articles overall made the document surprisingly seem very democratic, with even a rotating leader from different member states. Article 16: Does the CSSC have a hiring quota of technocrats to pull from each member state to ensure fair distribution of power when it concerns intra relations for interactions? Article 18 and others stated it but not for CSSC specifically to my understanding? Article 19 is another surprise as I thought Russia wouldn't want states to get away from their power.

Today's reading on the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) was insightful. The presentation on Tuesday noted that NATO was created during the cold war to deal with the Soviet Union, so seeing that Russia made this group as a response years later is interesting. Article 23 was a bit disturbing to me. "Privileges and immunities of the Organization shall be defined by the relevant international treaty." I know this is to be used in accordance with other international treaties. However, I was wondering what would happen if their goal of making the CSTO on par with NATO would impact this clause.

I have noticed that today's document has some similarities to NATO, as many of my colleagues have mentioned. Article 8 relates to my specialty in Counterterrorism, where it mentions the importance of unity and co-operation in order to combat terrorism. This is especially important because I believe that sharing information and resources can cause a significant change when it comes to terrorism.

Many have already pointed out the ways in which the CSTO attempts to mirror NATO, but one key difference is the relative equality among member states. It is true that the United States is the largest power in NATO and has often acted as the alliance's de facto leader. But Russia dominates the CSTO, owing both to geographic size disparity and legacy of political power.

The CSTO is Russia's way of retaining influence over what former Soviet republics it can in the wake of the USSR's collapse. It's creation, along with invasive military action in Ukraine, Georgia, and Chechnya, are all examples of Russia doing whatever it can to maintain power in its self-proclaimed "sphere of influence." Conflict over the destiny of these territories will be a source of friction between NATO and the CSTO for the foreseeable future.

I think that the best part of today's document is article 4 which says "The Organization shall co-operate in its activity with the states which are not the members of the Organization, keep in touch with the international intergovernmental organizations operating in the sphere of security. The Organization shall promote formation of the fair, democratic world order based on conventional principles of international law." This is important because at this time in the world cooperation between nations is key. I like that they base their rules on current international law. This means that they will put a lot of emphasis on human rights. That is because it is a hot button topic right now between what is going on in the USA, Turkey, China, and more. We are becoming more globalized and I think that this article puts focus on the laws that should be in place.

This document was highly interesting for the notion of a mirror image of NATO, and having read @David Broughton's response in which he noted that China has signed a "memo of understanding", I wonder how cooperation between the two entities might look, especially on the military side of things.

I agree with @David Broughton on the fact that while the Chinese have had their dealing with the CTSO, any membership is not a legitimate prospect for China. I notice that all of the nations in the CTSO fall under the hegemonic Russian sphere of influence, which is a mold China does not, and would make a point to never, fit in to.

In reading today's document, the organizational structure/ goals of The Collective Security Treaty Organization sounds a lot like NATO's. Especially article 7 compared to NATO's article 5. I want to research more into how effective this org is compared to NATO in cooperation. China is also involved in the org, having signed a memorandum of understanding between CSTO and The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which is on the linked website. However, I think it would be highly unlikely China were to ever formerly join the org or agree to a defense pact. Most of the current agreement deals with cooperation between the two organizations.

It seems the 3SI is between all the formerly Soviet Union states in the EU. In terms of energy independence, having to grow stronger regional bloc of their own to cooperate with each other makes them more interdependent on each other, but more independent from Russian oil as well. Overall, it's better for them to catch up to the regional disparity compared to their other EU counterparts. It looks like digital transformation and infrastructure seems to be a common key needed to lift states out of lagging behind in economic development and modernity. The African Union likewise targeted digital infrastructure as one of the most significant impacts to any growth it displayed the past several years (as evidenced by a former IAA document) and infrastructure in general (water and sanitation being the 2nd cause, but not touched upon by the 3SI member states here).

"...one overarching goal is to develop a north-south infrastructure corridor in the region..." reminds me of our prior document outlining Japan's plan to do a similar Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor/Mumbai-Ahmedabad High-Speed Railway in India (going longitude-wise). Japan also does East-West Economic Corridor and Southern Economic Corridor since it doesn't have that historic legacy the formerly Soviet Union/now EU bloc has (which covers the latitude counterpart). Seems that while 3SI states are strong east-west and just needs to implement north-south, Japan tries to cover it all in their FOIP. As I mentioned in a different comment, "Supporters also view the 3SI as a potential counterbalance to China’s interest in participating in regional infrastructure projects as part of its global Belt and Road Initiative." So by now, we potentially have attempts with NORDEFCO counterbalancing the Arctic, US & allies like Japan counterbalancing the South and East China Seas with the FOIP, and 3SI counterbalancing the BRI.

Questions: It's interesting that they mention a connecting pipeline between Hungary and Slovakia, then another one for GIPL, but why not mention connecting Poland and Slovakia for the overall broader North-South connection? There seems to be a gap in the middle there, unless there's already not-mentioned existing infrastructure there that they don't need to create a new project? The table includes ongoing projects, maybe didn't mention completed ones. Likewise, BRUA doesn't seem to mention any connection to Hungary-Slovakia LNG terminal. Unless that's the job of the transportation projects with the railways to connect all the energy infrastructure that linked certain countries but not others?

The three seas initiative is an interesting and an eye-opening project. The fact that major countries like the U.S, the EU, Germany, ...etc, have expressed their support as interested partners is a sign that the program is deemed to be successful. As some of my colleagues have mentioned, it is interesting to see that the U.S. is supporting the program to reduce the energy reliance on Russia.

The 3SI is a great program and I had never heard about it. The 3SI is very similar to the Belt and Road Initiative in how it is working on infrastructure within poorer regions to increase influence. Though compared to the BRI this program is small it is still a step in the right direction for East and West Europe to become connected.

Today's reading about the Three Seas' Initiative was eye-opening for me, especially on the subject of American interests in backing the initiative as a way of reducing European reliance on Russia for fuel/liquid natural gas. I also like the initiative as a geopolitical method of pulling Eastern Europe out of the "ex-Soviet, Russian sphere of influence" sociocultural mindset.

I think the coolest part of today's article is the digital highway that is going to use 5G, fiber optics, and an enhanced communication infrastructure. I think it is important to note that if countries are going to be sending more information between allies, cybersecurity needs to be a major priority. It is good to see the flow of information becoming easier between these European countries, but hacking is become a much bigger threat. These countries need to do their due diligence to make sure the information sent stays safe.

The Three seas Initiative is a step toward more connectivity across Europe and will likely strengthen the continent as a whole. Here’s why:

While Western Europe continues to be closely connected through transportation and energy, nations of the three seas initiative have lacked that same interconnectivity. For decades, the three seas initiative countries were disconnected from other parts of Europe by the ‘Iron Curtain’ (a term coined by Winston Churchill) from which we can still see some of those effects today (particularly in politics).

Priorities for the Initiative are energy, transportation, and digital projects. These priorities are in line with priorities of the rest of Europe. In particular, I want to draw attention to the digital priorities. I’ll list the digital priorities listed in the document here for reference:

· The Three Seas Digital Highway, a series of projects to improve data transfer and enhance communications infrastructure, including 5G technology and fiber optics

· 3SI Marketplace, seeking to boost trade and investment in the region by connecting small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to investment capital

· The SmartCity Forum, seeking to accelerate innovation and foster investment in innovation in regional cities Source: Three Seas Initiative Summit Bucharest, September 17-18, 2018, Three Seas Initiative Priority Interconnection Projects. Notes: The table includes proposed projects as well as in-progress projects.

As the EU still strives to be the world’s leader in climate change policy across several sectors, they know that a lot of work still needs to be done. The energy transition will be on a scale unseen since the Victorian Era when a lot of new technologies began to emerge, and the world began to look like what we see today. In order to make this happen, investments in technology and innovation must be scaled exponentially, and Europe (particularly Western Europe) knows this. After outlining a slew of ambitious climate change policies and goals for the EU by 2050, the next step is going to be investing in the technology and innovation to reach these goals. Especially since a lot of renewable energy is going to be dependent on certain regions (just because it’s cost effective in one place doesn’t mean it will be in another place), and technology and innovation will have to catch up to account for this.

If the Three Seas Initiative countries can make strides in digital innovation, energy, and transportation, this would not only connect the countries part of the initiative, but would also be likely to connect this part of Europe to Western European countries and be beneficial for all parties involved making the continent even stronger.

The Three Seas Initiative sounds a lot like the BRI to me, although with somewhat clearer intent. Xi announced the BRI in 2013 and I have seen countless lookalikes since then; the race to connect regions is in full swing. In my opinion, these regional infrastructure connection projects raise global interdependence and lower the possibility of war. I also liked to see a focus to link post-Cold War Soviet countries in Europe to the rest of the western, developed continent. This Initiative could go a long way to removing the east-west/north-south economic divides in Europe.

It's also no surprise to see the US fully backing the initiative, since much of the goal is to reduce energy reliance on Russia. 3SI and US economic/ security objectives are mostly aligned and the US would benefit greatly from increased demand of its natural gas supplies.

The NORDEFCO Annual Report for 2020 was the first time I've seen an organization address COVID positively towards impacting their mission/relevance/capabilities.

The Danish Chairmanship Priorities had targeted the Arctic and transatlantic relationships like with the US. Might the US use this security alliance to contain China's growing eye for the Arctic? They had mentioned how "in the light of emerging security challenges, the Arctic has become of increasing interest" but didn't specify. I'm willing to bet that China is one of those emerging security challenges since it designates itself as a "near-Arctic" state for future potential trade routes.

As for cyber security, the only Asian states they would have to worry about is China and North Korea. North Korea uses cyber attacks as one of its economic sources to bypass economic sanctions.

The issue with security of supply might concern China later down the line with global supply chains of various materials in general, including rare earth materials. Not too sure how much the Nordic countries depend on China though. Either way, the Arctic could have the potential to be the new South China Sea militarization, trade, and legal battles. According to Nikkei Asia's opinion piece with Humphrey Hawksley, China and Russia share the primary goal in developing energy resources, but China also has a dual mission to secure alternative supply chains to and from Europe. China has suggested in creating a Five plus One economic grouping with the five Nordic countries, but they probably won't succeed due to bad relations and human rights abuses in general with Europe.

Having such political and military integration in general for the NORDEFCO requires such a very high level of trust between these states. ASEAN is left in the dust compared to this level of cooperation, since ASEAN member states are too diverse in values, mostly non-interventionalist attitude, and different ways of going about solving crises (such as the case of the Myanmar military coup with Thailand, having a similar coup in 2014, hesitant on criticizing Myanmar).

The document today was quite interesting and I found that the interest that NORDEFCO has in the Arctic will eventually become a very important part to any Chinese diplomacy. China's navy and shipping elements see the Arctic as the next great leap for China's ever expanding market. With the BRI expanding into the Polar Silk Road and China expanding several ship yards and research bases in the area, the Arctic will be the next frontier of China's growing naval power. While NORDEFCO may be taking a strong stance on the Arctic, it will be interesting to see what happens when People's Liberation Army Navy begins to send ships into their waters.

NORDEFCO lies at the heart of my speciality. European security policy, especially that which pertains to Scandinavia and the High North, is taking on a new significance thanks to the build up of great power competition in the Arctic.

The Arctic is a largely peaceful region and even with all the new attention its getting is likely to remain so. However, its prioritization by NORDEFCO shows how prepared the states of the Nordic region are to defend the sovereignty of their neighborhood.

One of my favorite things about studying this particular region is discovering how smaller states like the Nordics are navigating the competition between the larger powers (USA, China, and Russia). As this document demonstrates, they can better prepare themselves for crisis by engaging in joint exercises and information sharing.

I like that cyber security is highlighted in today's document. The threats that are appearing online are becoming more and more difficult to deal with. It is good that the countries are cooperating to better deal with the problem. They are also running exercises to find the issues in their systems so they can better protect their citizens. I think that this is extremely important to protect the cyber rights of citizens. So many people have their lives online and it is important that foreign governments are not able to hack into security systems and steal information or government secrets.

Today's document brings forward an interesting contrast in regards to China. That being, the economic and military obstacle that Europe will pose to China as it attempts to expand it's Belt and Road Initiative further Westward. As EU member states continue to confront China on human rights abuses and the like, they have also taken steps to limit which sectors China can invest towards in Europe, such as the information technology industry. This pushes the question, with the heavy handed approach China has taken to Africa and to some extent the Middle East seeming less feasible in Europe, will China adopt a more formal and diplomatic approach to Europe, or develop yet another approach to Europe in the face of a more developed and united economic frontier?