Counterterrorism in the European Union

The Jihadist Terrorism report was interesting to note that the most successful attacks were likely to be lone wolf attacks while the ones to fail would involve group effort. This honestly does make more sense as the lone wolf can become spontaneous and randomly attack people - though with a lower potential body count. It also seems that ISIL is more accessible for people to join its ideology and mission rather than Al-Qaeda with its more complex attack planning, thus more ISIL activities being reported. My question though is what domestic policies were in place that makes some member states more vulnerable or successful than others? The EU most likely will have to address this unequal state of affairs in their agencies they assigned (addressed in the documents preceding this one).

Bringing up Buddhists as perceived to be attacking Sunni Islam made me remember that Aum Shinrikyo, the Japanese doomsday cult responsible for the Tokyo subway sarin attack (killed thirteen people and injured more than a thousand), had self-perceived itself to be Japanese Buddhism offshoot. I was a bit confused for the indicators this report used to measure its failed and complete attacks though. Why did the May 24 France attack fail when it injured 13 people via IED (page 36)? The attack did successfully go through, it just didn't kill anyone. The succeeding paragraph also confused me for the same reason. The male IT specialist working for a police intelligence unit is the prime example of what I had meant in a previous post with "ghost skins" for Europe. They needed to address that in their reports for investigation and not just mention the abuse of private and nonprofit sectors' services.

The mental illness distinction seemed to be very important, as according to Bruce Hoffman, it's important to distinguish motive due to terrorism being perceived by the actor as righteous and inherently unselfish compared to other types of criminal acts.

Overall, it seems the general trend for the profile of a terrorist that I can gather from this report is usually male, young in their 20s, and used either blades or IEDs. I was surprised not to see the use of vehicles as much, though I may have conflated past news reports with the EU's situation from 2015 to 2019.

A section that grasps my attention from the Counter-Terrorism Agenda for the EU was the EU's strategy and agenda for border security when protecting its internal and external borders within the Schengen area and new technologies to support such efforts on page 12. It highlights that EU nations must regulate their borders, as lenient border security opens/ exposes possible threats to communities and nations, while referencing the 2015 Paris terrorist attack orchestrated by foreign terrorist fighters from Syria. Taking into account that many refugees/asylum seekers who enter the EU are from Syria, Iran, and Afghanistan and enter through the sea borders(mainly Greece, Italy, and Spain), was the EU's commissions agenda to tighten border security a reflection of the many EU nations' reluctance to house refugees?

I question this because when looking at the European Commission Statistics on migration to Europe and its illegal EU border crossings by nationality for 2019 (https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/promoting-our-european-way-life/statistics-migration-europe_en#illegalbordercrossings) , Syrians and Afghani's made up the majority by 17 and 24 percent. Because of the active war zones and Islamic terrorist presence in counties like Syria and Afghanistan, asylum seekers from those regions have become a negative connotation with an association to terrorism. When looking at the recent October terrorist attacks in France, both terrorists were of refugee status acting in the name of Islam and one was in association with Russian jihadists. Terrorist attacks like these have sparked xenophobic tension and rhetoric towards Muslim migrants and refugees from both EU citizens and politicians, pushing for tight border security.

Today's reading was interesting and relates fully to what I have been posting on for the past couple weeks. What surprised me the most is that some cases of right-wing extremism were deemed as not terrorism. Right-wing extremism is not talked about as often as Islamic terrorism and I believe it is time to take right-wing extremism as seriously. I personally did not know that there were as many attacks by right wings extremists as portrayed by the article. I think even the media plays a role in choosing not to broadcast certain things to the public and maybe if they did it would be just for a couple days and then the story is forgotten. On the other hand, when it is a Radical Islamic terrorist attack the story is on every news channel.

One of the most fascinating (and disturbing) elements of this document is the link between sexual frustration plays in violent radicalization. As @Alex Gintz touched on, the lack of self-awareness and resulting conspiratorial attitudes towards women that stem from male loneliness and sexual frustration are problems that need to be solved at the socio-cultural level rather than the political one.

It's a connection that can be seen outside of terrorism as well. Many of the infamous school shooters in the United States (such as at Sandy Hook and Santa Barbra) were motivated by their unfulfilled desires and sense of victimization.

Just as I've commented on previous documents discussed, the key is finding ways to help these young men avoid the pitfalls of social isolation. Education supporting emotional and sexual health will be vital.

Right wing terrorism is a major issue facing the world today. It is the suppression and rejection of minorities all around the world. I like that the article touches on how it is made up of several subcurrents that all come together to make up right-wing extremism. As a human rights advocate, I would like to stress the importance of our inalienable rights. These are rights that are the exact same for all citizens, no matter their background. No one minority is given less rights, or deserves less attention. We are all created equal, and these types of groups threaten the equality that we have been striving to achieve. These groups use fake theories such as the "Great Replacement" to justify their actions. They genuinely believe that Jews are trying to replace the general population. Being Jewish, this is not only extremely offensive, but extremely inaccurate.

The concept that "right-wing extremist ideology is not uniform but feeds from different sub-currents, united in their rejection of diversity and minority rights" really stood out to me. White supremacy is nothing new- but we traditionally think of groups like the KKK (in the US) or the Nazi party. However, more recently white supremacy has been evolving and gaining momentum. The older white supremacy ideologies have been combining with a mixture of anti-Muslim, anti-immigrant, and the newer alt-right and neonationalist movements. As the line blurs between different right-wing extremist beliefs, I think that the threat of right-wing terrorism will only grow.

Secondly, the problem of online radicalization of terrorists, specifically right-wing extremists, cannot be overstated. Over a third of white supremacist extremists who carried out terrorist attacks from 2011-2019 explicitly stated they were inspired by another similar attacker or showed reverence for their acts. The copycat effect that is perpetuated on the dark web is truly terrifying. This link has some really good graphics to visualize lot of what this Europol document mentions.

The first thought that came to mind after finishing today's document was that I don't think it's surprising that far-right extremism gets a bit of a free pass, for want of a better term. The reasoning for most far right extremism is often less-explicit on the surface and based outside of religion or spirituality, with a pseudo-political core. This would seem to make it easy to bring people under the umbrella of more extremist views through rhetoric alone. One example of this is what I regard as an extremely unhealthy dialogue surrounding male-female relationships. Technically, there's nothing politically dangerous about sexually frustrated men feeling that their lack of success in relationships indicates some form of female inferiority to men. Despite this lack of technical danger, a man, particularly a young one, who is struggling with a sense of belonging and purpose as a result of romantic failure is much more susceptible to falling into an echo-chamber of extreme, resentful, misogynist views. For aspects like this that contribute to the development of far-right extremism, I don't believe there's a political solution.

“The right-wing scene is described as extremely heterogeneous both from a structural and ideological perspective (pg. 5).” At first glance, this may seem somewhat assuring given that there would be no clear message or real structure to the right-wing extremist groups and demonstrate an inability to carry out any violent attacks consolidated by some widely supported or common goal and ideology. However, what’s more concerning from the right-wing terrorism article as opposed to Juhadist terrorism are these public networking events that have been cited in the article that can help make it easier for different groups under right-wing extremism to meet and perhaps coordinate a more unified message that I believe would lead to more attacks. What’s even more concerning is that in the EU, some of these violent attacks by right-wing extremism aren’t classified as terrorism under national legislation. Specifying violent right-wing extremist attacks under national legislation as terrorism in Europe may deter certain right-wing extremist groups from carrying out attacks. If Europe and the rest of the world truly wish to tackle terrorism and pass comprehensive counterterrorism legislation, that should begin with defining terrorism as terrorism despite what groups this may or may not affect.

While there is little to no white-supremacist attacks in China, I appreciated the chapter's focus on the interconnectivity of these extremist groups. It amazes me that Europe's far-right extremist groups use music venues and concerts to network between the groups. While thee groups remain largely are independent to each other, their ability to coordinate a possible large-scale attack is heightened by these networking events. The "Rock against Communism" music genre was noted as a massive unifying event for these groups. I believe events like this, meant to side-step home country bans on specific groups, create a greater security risk for Europe as a whole than any one group could pose.

While wholly outside of my specialty, today's article was still an interesting read. My greatest takeaway from the reading was that the existence of multiple ideological draws to terrorism in Europe are not only threats to the general cosmopolitan population of Europe, but direct threats to each other in their ultimate aims. I wonder if the two "groups" (loosely defined) might try to undermine each other?

Today's article on Right-wing terrorism is disturbing. In comparison to Jihadist terrorism, it seems as if right-wing terrorists can have more interactions with one another. I simply couldn't fathom a Jihadist group in Europe being allowed to do paramilitary training in public spaces without law enforcement getting involved. In addition to this, I find it interesting that other right-wing attacks aren't considered terrorism under national legislation. If this was the case, these statistics would be doubled.

I understand that there is a racial bias in terrorism, yet I fail to understand why right-wing terrorism fails to have the same counterterrorism efforts as other forms of terrorism. If anything, it's more harmful than international terrorism as the perpetrators actively seek to blend into all forms of society and successfully do as they're white. Governments across the EU have far-right groups/members in their parliaments and are gaining more traction as immigration to the EU increases. Xenophobia, racism, and populism are also gaining traction as a result.

While the article doesn't specifically relate to Latin American immigration, I argue that these current counterterrorism policies will impact immigration in the future should far-right members gain enough traction to influence foreign policy.

It's kind of interesting to note that France has arrested significantly more suspected jihadists than any other European country. Some of this could potentially be explained by the fact that France (at least in 2018) has the highest proportion of Muslims to non-muslims in all of Europe, largely due to migration from the Maghreb and the Sahel. Though of course, not all Muslims are Jihadists, and this correlation does not equate to causation.

A more prominent factor may be the fact that France has historically had some shaky relationships with Muslim countries. Wounds from French colonial regimes in Algeria, Tunisia, and Morroco remain to this day, and French presence in the Sahel and the middle east may fuel hatred against them. More recently, France banning the hijab and President Macron's controversial comments about Islam may further widen the rift between France and the Muslim world, leading to more risk for terrorist attacks in France.

My two main takeaways from this piece will echo what has already been said. Nevertheless, I was impressed that this document made a point of discussing the links between mental health and terrorism. It's always easy to assume absolute malevolence on the part of a criminal, however human beings are too complicated for such a quick, clear-cut standard of judgement. I was also impressed to see a clear definition of Jihadist terrorism. Over the past 5 years or so, I feel as though there's been a serious upswing in the use of the term terrorism as applied to many different acts of violence. I worry that applying the term terrorist to perpetrators of shootings, for example, will discredit the severity of the cause motivated nature of terrorist acts, awful as general shootings may be.

Today's article on Jihadist terrorism was informative. While the term is frequently mentioned, this is the first document I've come across that defined the term and provided clear examples. Seeing the general trend decrease from 2016-19 reveals that counterterrorism efforts are working in the EU. I wonder how much of this is due to mental health work on this demographic? The statistics on mental health provided useful information on discerning mental illness from extremism. If more research can be done in this area, I think the spread of radicalization in the EU might decrease extensively.

While this isn't comparable to my specialty, the cases detailed reveal a general pattern of gender and age. Potential research should be done on masculinity and extremism. I recall the UK statistic on men having untreated mental health issues that they fail to seek help for as a result of their gender. With the EU being generally individualistic in some aspects, a man's feelings of having a "Greater purpose" in life in conjunction with mental illness might lead to extremism.

The last thought I have on this article is on the rise in Xenophobia. Despite the data revealing a decreasing trend in individuals arrested, coverage on the topic is increasing in Western media. I wonder if this information will add to the growing dissent on immigrants in the EU.

I am concerned that the problem of jihadist terrorism will be exacerbated in Western Europe. As there has been a consistent stream of radical Islamist attacks in Western Europe since around 2015, negative perceptions of Muslims has been growing. For example, there has been a number of anti-Islamic laws in Europe like France's veil ban. As individuals feel excluded or disenfranchised by society, anger and frustration are more likely to lead to aggressive responses.

I was also rather impressed by the number of foiled attacks and arrests in early planning. Connecting this to Russia, just this week 19 people were arrested by the FSB in Russia as suspected radical Islamists.

I think it is important to note that the three completed attacks were carried out by lone suspects (although IS claimed responsibility for one), and in contrast the majority of foiled attacks had multiple suspects. As the document mentions, jihadists in Europe have very loose networks. The lack of formal structure it difficult not only to identify radicalized individuals that may pursue violence, but also to investigate and stop attacks.

While outside of my specialty, this article remains a fascinating read primarily because of the connection it suggests between mental health issues and certain terroristic tendencies, and because it gives a clear definition of Jihadism to identify and work against. I think that it would be of indescribable benefit to the situation of the Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang if the CCP made an effort to properly define extremism, and isolate/identify as legitimate extremist attacks as examples of extremist attacks, thereby producing an actual counterterrorist campaign out of the current, general anti-Uyghur policies in place. For reasons that I feel are obvious, I doubt that the CCP will ever do that.

It was interesting to read the mental illness aspect to terrorists' behaviors. I think most people do not think of terrorists as mentally ill, but rather just radical and extreme. In addition, as mentioned, personality disorders are a contributing factor to why some people choose to join a terrorist group. One sentence that caught my eye is "radicalisation offered him an identity". People look for whatever means they ca get in order to have a sense of direction.

It was interesting to see the number of plots that were foiled, I think that was a great sucess by the law enforcement agencies.

The Europol Jihadist Terrorism article was very enlightening. A few things I thought the article did well:

1. Defined what Jihadist terrorism is and gave a little bit of background and context.

2. Discussed the link between terrorism and mental health.

3. Discussed the number of foiled terrorist plots by law enforcement in 2019.

Areas for expansion: While I think the article did a good job introducing or discussing the link between mental health and terrorism (something we haven’t really read or considered until this point), I would like to see more studies/cases/research done on that don’t necessarily give a timeline, but a more defined analysis of how mental health can lead to terrorism or “violent acts” considered to be terrorism specifically.

However, I think this article does open up a broader discussion of how mental illness is treated in certain societies or countries. For instance, are the perpetrators that carry out these violent attacks that are linked to mental illness getting treatment for it before they carry out these attacks? Do their disorders go unnoticed until they carry out an attack? Although this article does directly relate to terrorism, I think one major takeaway from it could also be how mental illness is diagnosed/treated. The article only gives a few examples of instances that untreated disorders (perhaps) can not only put the individual at risk, but in the case of the Hague stabbings in the Netherlands in 2018, put others at risk as well. We can’t allow an illness to get to that point especially when extremists may target people who are more susceptible to radicalization or simply target those that could be acting out as a symptom of their disorder.

What constitutes as terrorism is the “unlawful use of violence and intimidation, especially against civilians, in the pursuit of political aims”; and when looking into the document, it is a bit confusing to understand if the mental state of these perpetrators are being labeled accordingly. Another form of terrorism that seems to get confused for political terrorism is the religious side of terrorism where extreme heinous acts are carried out on specific ethnic groups. On page 35 we see that Jihadist terrorism is better suited for those with mental instability which cause a radicalization effect which in turn blurs the ideological conviction of the crime. Take for example on page 36 when a court case came about involving “The Hague (Netherlands) on 5 May 2018, for example, the court held that there was no terrorist motive and that the perpetrator’s actions were the result of a psychotic disorder“. If we look at statistics though we see there is a steady decrease in arrested suspects in the EU, from 687 people in 2015 to 436 in 2019. I feel that implementing AI to facial recognize people at airports would be beneficial to catching those that may inflict harm on others for political gains or mental instability. To further explain my thoughts on AI software and in airports, I feel that right after exiting and entering the aircraft, one should have their picture taken and uploaded into a database to track individuals on how long they have been gone and to have their picture in a database to reference later. If a camera picks up their face signature after an attack and the perpetrator gets away, it would send a signal to authorities with both a clear photo from the airport and a small clip of the person in action committing the crimes. This would fall under defense innovation and counter terrorism measures.

I liked that the Europol Jihadist Terrorism chapter gave a precise and clear definition of what Jihadism is and who would be classified as a Jihadi terrorist. This helps policymakers/ judges to better understand the characteristics of this type of extremism and how to better combat radicalization towards Jihadism. China could take note of definitions like these, which would enable them to better identify suspected terrorists in the PRC. Because China does not have a clear definition of any type of terrorism, they employ a mass surveillance and detention strategy of suspect demographics, such as the Uyghurs of Xinjiang. There have been legitimate extremist attacks in the province, such as the needle attacks in 2009, but labeling any Uyghur's that hold anti-CCP views as extremists have resulted in the reported 1.5 million detainees in their re-education camps. China has a complicated argument to make in justifying these mass detentions in the name of combating terrorist extremism.

I also appreciated the chapters linkage of mental health and terrorism. Many extremist tendencies/ actions are very similar to tendencies of those combating mental health disorders. Regarding The Hague stabbings in May of 2018, the judge presiding over the case determined his actions were the result of his paranoid psychosis, eve though his actions appeared to be a terrorist act. Mental health disorders could present symptoms similar to extremism and I am happy to see institutions like Europol are distinguishing between the two.

I like that today's article gave an entire side section that focused on mental health and terrorism. It highlighted the fact that sometimes individuals that have mental disorders can display signs of radicalization. This is not due to their ideology, but due to their illness. They give the example of the Hague stabbings that took place in the Netherlands in 2018. It was deduced that the attack had no terrorist motive and that the reason for the attack was actually due to the perpetrators paranoid psychosis. The Utrecht attack was also carried out by someone with a mental disorder. He had a personality disorder that played a large part in his reasoning for carrying out the attack. People who are mentally unstable will be swayed more easily online. I think that it is important for mental health experts to focus on a way to deter those with certain conditions from falling for these radicalizing traps online. There are extremists that are taking advantage of people with mental illnesses, this is not something that we can allow to take place.

This article was out of my field of specialization, though I do see there must be certain parameters to security for border control. Outside threats area always a possibility and I feel that adding more technology could improve the threat of terrorsist, especially in today's advance technology world. I really liked how detailed the framework for foreign threats was laid out where there are teams to respond to each type of threat. I liked that the document wasn't vague, but detailed a strategic plan.

Technically, terrorism is only 5.2% of the top challenges that faces ASEAN countries (The State of Southeast Asia: 2021 journal from a PowerPoint slide by David Kang in a JQAS conference for "East Asia’s Surprising Stability & US Foreign Policy Conference by John Quincy Adams Society" I attended today). I imagine that the rest of the East Asia region to the north wouldn't be too particularly worried about terrorism much either, aside from incidental ones like the Matsumoto sarin attack and Tokyo Subway sarin attack by the doomsday cult Aum Shinrikyo in Japan. China has its Xinjiang region monitored for "terrorism" and does wider cooperation efforts with Central Asia due to geography.

That being said, there are more comparisons that can be made. The architectural book on urban design to incorporate urban planning for security does remind me of how China has been urbanizing the Xinjiang region with internal colonization by the Han Chinese, which is another way of controlling its own populations alongside Hukou ((https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sJ3fG-tnzCk) wherein a large proportion of government-incentivized settlers are affiliated with military/security/agricultural companies to do the construction.

Having to foster cooperation between different faith communities for the EU is taken at a more extreme step of co-optation by China with the state-sponsored mosques (refer to yesterday's comment and same YouTube link). The document's Key Actions stating "physical protection of places of worship" is in direct contrast to China's treatment of the mosques. In the same undercover investigation within the YouTube link, you can see undercover bouncers at a mosque entrance preventing the undercover tourists/journalists inside.

Just like yesterday's comment, China's Shanghai Five cooperation with the SCO is similar to the EU with the ETIAS watchlist in sharing data. China also raises extradition cooperation from Central Asia. For instance, Uyghur political activist and Canadian citizen Huseyin Celil is but one example of "how effective China has been in developing security and counter-terrorism cooperation with neighboring states, particularly those in Central Asia. Celil was arrested and extradited to China by Uzbek authorities in March 2006, where he was subsequently trialed in a closed court in Urumqi and convicted to life imprisonment for ‘separatist activities’ in June 2006" (Clarke, 2010, pg. 26-27). China forms bilateral security agreements and police cooperation to extradite purported "Uyghur 'separatists and terrorists' from Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan and Nepal" from 2002 to 2004 (pg. 27).

Another step for further internal security research for China would be a follow-up study on China's criminal justice system in general, along with regulation of weapons. The EU's Firearms Directive to register them to the owner and sharing information is worth a comparison to see if China has similar programs and for what uses. After all, China had forced people to give up all their kitchen utensils to produce steel in the past, albeit probably lacked the security dimension behind it.

The EU stating itself to have the most advanced legislation in restricting explosive precursors being acquired is a curious statement to me. In Clarke's paper, China had heavy sentences both explicitly and implicitly for these various acts (especially in stealing explosives from "State organs"). The death penalty is within legal consideration after all. Perhaps the EU had meant a more comprehensive set of regulations rather than specific emphasis on punishment like China's.

Both the EU and China seems to follow the UN approach to terrorism. According to Clarke on page 12, there are two international understandings of terrorism to criminalize. The Western-led one advocates for strict legal regime to prosecute terrorists by their acts no matter the motive behind them. Meanwhile, other states (especially in the developing world) give consideration to the possibility of terrorist acts "against a racist or occupying state for example as legitimate political violence". As such, the past international agreements resulted with some affirmation to the right of self-determination via acts of terrorism (1979 UN Convention against the Taking of Hostages). 9/11 had changed that framework whereiin the "more recent UN conventions and resolutions have replaced the affirmation of the right to self-determination with unequivocal statements criminalising acts of terrorism." Thus, China had seized upon this international trend for an excuse to widen their scope of counterterrorism and crimes in general to dispel possible dissent for all its citizens. This particularly engenders more targeted approach for the Xinjiang region due to a certain degree of East Turkistan separatist movements, but also due to the high concentration of its ethnic minority group clustered in one location at China's margins. I suspect that may be due to fear of collective action organization under those demographic and geographic locations. As according to the YouTube link as well, that is why the Han Chinese are incentivized to move to that province to surround and dilute the Uyghur population so that it would no longer be the majority group within their own province.

Finally, China does have a false aspect in their treatment towards Uyghurs in a mock-fashion of the "inclusive and welcoming society fully respectful of the rights of all is a society where terrorists will find it more difficult to radicalise and recruit" that the EU espouses. China has its "soft and hard" policies for at least the past 30 years toward ethnic minority, religious, and cultural expressions. When China does imitate "relative tolerance and even encouragement of institutionalized Islam...state-funding for mosque construction and the activities of the state-controlled Chinese Islamic Association" it's for gaining agreement and obedience with the Uyghur population.

For the link with Clarke's paper repeatedly mentioned above: https://www.linkedin.com/posts/crystal-lin-b54b0215a_chinas-anti-terror-laws-and-human-rights-activity-6767641845267865600-fXyi

General bullet thoughts on document:

The EU setting minimum obligations for those responsible for security of public spaces do remind me of how it's like building codes for safety measures, except instead of looking out for fires and structural integrity to prevent collapse, the EU expands into the realm of counterterrorism to consider.

It's interesting the EU lets "interested cities" sign up for its EU Pledge on Urban Security and Resilience considering the urgency needed for widespread coordination, as this suggests a mostly voluntary endeavor.

I highly favor how the EU treats critical infrastructure through both physical and digital lens of security needs. A Florida city was affected by a recent cyber attack on its water system twice, but both times were stopped by an employee on duty. I had felt the proximity of potential danger. Similarly, Texas being caught in a blackout by the snow storms also suggest improvement in emergency planning during the pre-crisis phase before it's too late when they hit.

The EU allowing derogations for border management does raise some concern for me, as it suggests prioritizing speed over compliance to regulation. What effect will this have for security practices against migrants? And structural cohesion? Entry bans also seem like it would need a lot of detail to pour over for consideration, since they would need to regulate for the average person visiting family abroad.

It's intriguing that the EU is starting to really look into the utilizing API & PNR considering they had heavily weighed passenger flight privacy compared to the US no-fly list.

The EU seems to be cognizant of terrorists abusing the private sector and nonprofits by utilizing their cross-border services to recruit others and more. This reminds me of last week's document with the FBI investigative report citing "ghost skins" infiltrating law enforcement. However, it seems the EU still has not addressed the issue of infiltration within their own law enforcement.

I was glad to see that the EU is taking cooperation with Southern Mediterranean states seriously. As @Nadeen Ghazy noted, information sharing agreements are key to combating terrorism and organized crime. And as the document notes, instability in any of these countries has the potential to directly impact European security.

I wish the document had gone slightly more in-depth about counter-terrorism partnerships in the Sahel. The instability in the Sahel is of prime concern for Europe, as it can fuel crime and terrorism in other nearby countries and could lead to a variety of issues for Europeans. I would be interested in what countries in the region were of particular concern for Europe, or if there were many in the area that the EU was pursuing partnerships with.

On page 12, I was surprised to see the number of foreign fighters that traveled to Syria and Iraq to join terrorists. I wonder whether the EU's efforts to detect possible terrorists at the borders is going to work? In my mind, terrorists are smart and would do all they can to cover their real intentions and blend in. In addition, I like how the EU mentioned the protection of places of worship because I believe they are most at risk of being attacked since terrorists target others that do not follow the same religion.

Information exchange I believe is the best way to combat terrorism. The global analyzing of information about a suspected terrorist is beneficial. However, this raises the question of privacy? Is it just going to be for certain personnel or everyone?

In part ll of the EU’s Counterterrorism Agenda, while it looks like the EU is taking good steps towards counterterrorism, two particular points stood out to me.

1. The Terrorist Finance Tracking Programme (TFTP)- on page 19 of the document, it discusses the financial aspects of terrorist organizations and investigations into terrorist financing. It noted that the TFTP has “already generated significant intelligence that has helped investigate and detect terrorist plots and trace those behind them.” At the base of terrorism, financing is probably one of the single most important ways to prevent terrorist organizations from carrying out attacks. If their financing is cut off and made very difficult to get, then things like recruiting, resources needed to carry out attacks, etc. will be nearly impossible to do.

2. Equally important- Digital Services Act (pg. 10), and Evidence Digital Exchange System (eEDES). Any sort of digital monitoring in terms of currency/exchange, social media, and encrypted information are only going to grow in importance as more of our daily lives, work, currency, etc. moves more and more to digital platforms. For terrorist groups, the internet and social media is going to be a big tool to help these groups spread their messages and make it easier to recruit members. If digital services were more closely monitored in terms of this kind of activity, I think it would be very useful. However, I think it would get tricky while monitoring certain messages/ideologies/etc. that would be flagged or classified as potential terrorist activity, not to mention privacy rights. This doesn’t make combating terrorism any easier but if executed right, I think it could be very effective in shrinking the size of terrorist threats (cutting off financing and halting the means to spread info and recruit members).

I had never considered the idea of something akin to a Financial Intelligence Unit before, and I'm curious to see how administrative power over such a body would be dispersed. I think investigators having access to bank accounts at different levels would be useful for ensuring accountability from organizations, but may cause problems at the civilian level down the line. Again, I'm not too familiar with the attitude towards such ideas in Europe, but I can't imagine the access these FIUs may push for being overtly well received.

Pages 10-24 left me with questions today.

1.) Information Technology is a field that currently lacks diversity. There have been cases where facial recognition, AI, and other tech tools have shown a bias to people with darker skin tones. How does the technology created to combat terrorism remove this bias?

2.) How will these policies directed towards third countries impact travel and immigration?

3.) Will the development of IT improve the infrastructure of important cities combatting terrorism?

4.) Will these policies impact domestic terrorists as well?

While I understand the importance of increased surveillance in counterterrorism, I'm seeing a pattern of privacy concerns. The article notes that EU citizens will have safeguards to ensure privacy, but what about non-citizens/migrants? I like how this article section is similar to the US strategy on counterterrorism. Their views on re-integration for extremists are insightful, as both the US and the EU are now wanting to create effective reintegration programs.

With Latin American immigration, facial recognition could potentially be used to mitigate the migrant crisis. With individuals disappearing along migrant routes, this technology would reveal when/where they were last seen.

In this selection of the document, I did not really see a direct connection to my specialty, but it was still a highly interesting read. I expected further restrictions on firearms rights and the intent to work closely with Interpol, but found myself intrigued by the concept of the Financial Intelligence Units, which I believe are a great idea that could be applied on an even broader scale in order to stem terrorism by cutting off its finances. Imagine if ISIS has been unable to profit from the sale of oil in the mid-2010s? They would not be/have been nearly as much of a threat.

I thought it was very interesting that the EU Counter-Terrorism agenda included the need for international cooperation with those outside the EU across all four pillars (point 5). The EU is already a large group of countries, yet this acknowledges that all of their combined power still wouldn't be enough to stop terrorism. The document highlighted the Southern Neighborhood (Northern Africa) and the Western Balkans which are in close proximity. However, it also mentioned the Horn of Africa, the Sahel region, and parts of Asia all of which are not neighboring the EU. This shows that the threat of terror is a truly global problem and must have a global solution. One country affects others, no matter how far away.

Facial recognition will be the next thing when it comes to catching criminals and being able to develop such technologies that can understand how someone ages is around the corner. We call this DEFENSE INNOVAITON. Using facial recognition here in the US would be valuable, as seen with the FBI, they simply post pictures up and hope for the public to do some of the work. Whereas, if you could cut out the people and rely a little more on technology to do the work, it would be a win for the FBI. Nevertheless, I saw encrypted data through companies which is also a smart idea. I would like to talk about the history of terrorism though the EU to better understand why such rules were implemented. The IRA has always set up bombings in Ireland and has been pushed back to Northern Ireland over the years, however there is always a threat of an insurgent putting a bomb in a garbage can or underneath a car to create havoc. Border security was heightened at the time of the Paris Bombing. The document highlights how "It is estimated that 50 000 persons have travelled to Syria and Iraq to join jihadist groups, including 5 000 individuals from the EU, of which around one third are still located in the area." which shows the importance of having AI to help police officers detecting if someone is wanted or a terrorist in facial recognition. The prevention and mitigation techniques are like our procedures in the United States as well from what I have read. Religion was also discussed and how people may be targeted more often; as seen with the Christchurch, New Zealand attack, so some policies were made to protect those in places of worship as seen on page 12 “foster cooperation between the different faith communities and the relevant national authorities as they exchange experiences. As from 2021, the Commission aims to support projects that enhance the physical protection of places of worship in close coordination with Member States”. This leads us to how terrorists attack people through means of firearms, where the EU laid out a plan to “the Commission will adopt an implementing regulation under the Firearms Directive, establishing a system for exchange of information amongst Member States on refusals to grant authorizations for acquiring a firearm” which means if denied in one state that individual will be denied in other participating states. Next on the list are bombs, I mentioned bombs above, but bombs are a generic term with a broad audience. There are several types of bombs used and the restriction of allowing people to obtain specific chemicals would be implemented. The four types of bombs are “chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear” which can wreak havoc in small locations. I think this document did a fine job in reviewing past events in history to make well decisive defense plans for possible future events.

We've been talking about big comprehensive ways to combat terrorism and discourage radicalization, such as regulating social media, changing the culture of prisons, and making young people feel included in society.

All that is important, but smaller and more utilitarian actions are often just as important, and I noticed some of these in today's reading.

In the section titled "Denying terrorists the means to attack," the document mentions the intent to adopt a system for exchange of information under the Firearms Directive, which would stop persons who have been denied firearm authorization in one member state from acquiring a similar permit in another. The section also includes plans for stemming the traffic of illegal firearms and restricting access to materials that could be used for explosives or biological weapons.

Large-scale societal reforms are crucial for counterterrorism in the long-run, but restricting the opportunity-giving tools of violence is an effective tactic in the short term.

While I could not find anything to relate to my specialty, I took a particular notice to the document's suggestion to combat the financing networks that provide terrorist organizations resources to carry out attacks. I think the Financial Intelligence Units (FIU) would be vital to stemming terrorist attacks globally. If they can't fund the operation, then terrorist attacks would surely become more and more rare. Cross-border access to suspicious bank accounts could also help the FIU's combat foreign terrorist financing. As Eric mentioned above, I believe an individual right to privacy should always be on policymakers minds. It is very easy to go down the wrong path in the name of combating extremism/ terrorism.

I enjoyed how on page 20, the document touches on encrypted information. I feel like this is a very important part in securing our rights to privacy and data protection. It can also be used in a negative way. Many terrorist groups are able to message each other information that can be detrimental to many civilians through encrypted messaging. This causes an interesting dilemma. The European Union needs to respect the rights of its citizens while also stopping and intercepting potentially harmful messages from being sent. The encryption is obviously put in place for privacy reasons, so unencrypting them would be a violation of privacy rights. The EU is looking for a lawful way to counter terrorism plans that are sent using encryption. I think that this is an especially interesting topic that will require some serious thought. Many people look at major human rights atrocities and tend to overlook the smaller issues like privacy. It is important to protect every human's inalienable rights, no matter how small. People encrypt information because they don't want it to be easily accessible. Is it okay for the government to intercept messages they think could be harmful? I feel like this could very quickly lead to an abuse of power by government officials.

With this document of the European Union on counterterrorism made me wonder if South American or Latin American countries had a union. In fact, they do! It’s called the Union of South American Nations. I was researching to see if the UNASUR had a counterterrorism agenda. I couldn’t find it however “Unasur has become the preferred scenario for political dialogue and consensus in South America. In the process of strengthening the bilateral relations of Colombia with the region, the strategy to increase the nation’s proactive participation in this forum has fostered the creation of a new way in which our country relates to the others”.

Counterterrorism Agenda of the EU: Part I Questions that stood out to me:

- What is the difference between risk assessment and threat assessment in the Anticipate phase?

- According to footnote 11, does "legal framework sets out performance standards for detection equipment. This framework only applies to aviation security and not, for example, for detection equipment used to protect other public spaces" mean that aviation detection ensures best quality? Usually the private sector is more innovative though, so if it's not the best quality, then expanding measures beyond the aviation sector to other detection technologies would probably mean that they just provide a more coordinated and comprehensive minimum limit these technologies would have to meet.

- In terms of drone regulation needing to register with the government, my question would be if visitors to the EU would also need to do so if they bring their drones with them?

- On the section regarding prisons and the need for risk assessment and rehabilitation of inmates does bear to mind whether there would be similar ghost skins (not necessarily white supremacists) in the EU for law enforcement to look out for. After all, the FBI had to find ways to preclude them from entering law enforcement.

I also thought it was interesting that with each new technology that comes out, we normally think of what other uses they can have spillover effects with various adaptations, but that also means security experts, policymakers, and law enforcement would have to think of these applications ahead of the curve before anyone else (lest terrorists uses them for nefarious purposes).

I also am convinced that Europe continues to follow a more humane-approach towards keeping the comforts of its citizens in mind, specifically with balance of privacy, prisoner rehabilitation and reintegration, and respect towards not degrading human rights here, along with expanding hate speech to EU-level crimes. However, I am curious on how that initiative on page 7 would fare in some troubled states like Hungary and Poland (especially when they are known for being the worst EU states in treatment towards sexuality and women's rights with abortion).

East Asia connections:

Like the EU in prioritizing cybersecurity (and pretty much every document we've had so far), South Korea and the US have been strengthening it and intelligence as well. This is based off of Saunders' "The Rebalance to Asia: U.S.-China Relations and Regional Security" paper published in 2013.

The EU wants to upgrade its Artificial Intelligence systems: According to Joseph Nye's paper in 2020, China had also been developing their Artificial Intelligence capability too. Coupling that with China's Golden Shield Project that had been first initiated in late 1990s with successfully completed phases since then for an all-encompassing surveillance network that combined several population databases together and street cameras, perhaps China has already pulled ahead of the EU in terms of "terrorism prevention" (which for China is really just an excuse for dispelling dissent before they can really arise in collective action organizing). This is based on "To Repress or to Co-opt? Authoritarian Control in the Age of Digital Surveillance" paper by Xu Xu in 2020. RED-Alert had reminded me of China's monitoring system.

Wanting to create reliable counter-measure technologies against malicious drones had also reminded me of China trying to create more anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) technologies against the US military in the South China Sea (Nye's paper in 2020).

"Adoption by the European Parliament and the Council is therefore a matter of urgency" to ensure swift removal of content also makes me think China would not necessarily have this problem due to the unitary top-down nature of the policymaking. This further reinforces my belief that China may be ahead of the curve in terms of regulation for any bad actors, especially when their internal security budget outweighs their military one.

The EU call for transparency for international partners probably would not matter so much with China in a geographical proximity sense, but either way China has already deliberately obscured its counterterrorism practices in the Xinjiang region by not letting tourists see authentic Uyghur neighborhoods (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sJ3fG-tnzCk).

"Promoting inclusion and providing opportunities for young people at risk through education" has a sort of deleterious take with China and its "re-education camps".

Having the EU collaborate with civil society including faith groups also reminded me of how China regulates mosques and only approves state-sanctioned ones (source: that YouTube link).

The thing that caught my eye the most is countering extremist ideologies online. Using social media outlets is a big part of the terrorist organizations' agenda. The reason for this is that their ideology reaches more people and therefore the chances of radicalisation increases. By regulating online content, it decreases their ability to reach people that are at risk of radicalization. Also, the facial recognition technology seems interesting, and it makes me wonder how effective it can be.

The section of the document that most stood out to me was page four, speaking about facial recognition technology. The idea of using facial recognition technology to prevent anti-state action is not a new one, with China having used it for years as a part of their "social credit" system; I'm sure that attempts to implement it in Europe would be met with stiff resistance out of fear that it would be used in the same way by faceless bureaucrats.

I was intrigued by the strategy's mention of the need for collaboration among cities, the Radicalization Awareness Network, and the "EU Cities Against Radicalization."

When looking at broad strategy documents such as this one, it is easy to forget that though federal and supranational governments may compose top-down guidelines and solutions to dealing with problems, much of the work that is done to improve a community is done through bottom-up initiatives.

I appreciate that the EU sees the need to make sure young people feel included and socially healthy. Social isolation and a longing for fraternity are among the chief factors that lead to radicalization. The importance of giving young people opportunities and a sense of belonging in their communities cannot be overstated.

I also like how the Commission acknowledges that this social isolation can be real or perceived, highlighting just how important the day-to-day experiences of all members of a community are.

Two parts caught my attention: regulation of terrorist content online and foreign terrorist fighters. Online radicalization is a global concern. I thought the proposal for a new Digital Services Act and requiring companies to be more responsive in preventing the dissemination of terrorist content on their platforms was very interesting. This debate over the responsibility of "big tech" has come to the forefront again with the recent January 6 storming of the Capitol.

There has also been a significant number of Russian foreign fighters in the Middle East region, especially in Syria. The mention was brief but I am curious to know what the EU will propose to address the foreign fighter problem. It is a very complex issue and will need coordination.

I am excited to be reading documents from the EU to see how they differ from the USA. It is very interesting to me seeing how the United States did not mention human rights very much in the piece that we read last week. This EU article mentions the fundamental rights of individuals multiple times within the first ten pages. I feel as though the EU tends to focus on human rights more than the United States does simply because they are more left leaning than we are. The ECtHR is constantly reviewing cases about human rights and making sure no one has their rights infringed upon. The very first sentences state that they want to protect "Democracy, rule of law, respect for fundamental rights in particular the right to privacy, freedom of expression, freedom of religion and the respect for diversity are the foundation of our Union." This is a good start to an article such as this because there are many instances when certain human rights are put second to stopping terrorists, or terrorism is used as an excuse to bypass laws. The European Union does a good job of making sure their citizens rights always come first.

The facial identification section of the document, page 4, stood out to me above the rest. I imagine that there will be some serious opposition to the use of technology such as facial recognition in the E.U. In the U.S. this is an idea that would certainly elicit some rather extreme responses if it were proposed to the public, and many of the questions would carry over to this situation in Europe, I imagine. "Who sees us?" "Whose hands does the information pass through?" "How will privacy be protected?" "Do you have the right?" In China, for example, facial recognition software has been in use for some time, particularly as part of enforcing China's social credit system - a form of blacklist dedicated to surveying and tracking the "social credit" (read: social desirability) of individuals and businesses. Certainly, the ought to be some public scrutiny as to how technology of such a nature will be applied and used, whether it be in Europe, North America, etc.

The concept that stood out to me the most was the use of new technologies and how they can contribute to the protection of public spaces if they are used in a well-defined, targeted and proportionate manner. Facial recognition software is a fast growing tool used to identify terrorists/ suspicious items in public spaces using AI softwares and reference databases of known terrorists.

China could take a particular note to the "well-defined, targeted, and proportionate manner" section of this concept. China has long used facial recognition software on its citizens, often with a massively broad scope. China has no public definition of what a terrorist is, and it can be assumed the CCP's private definition is not one used by the international community. China also does not use its facial recognition software in a targeted manner, yet there are no public documents outlining their use of the software so there is no way to know for sure. Chinese citizens have been detained or imprisoned for very simple things like government dissention, such as the Uyghurs in Xinjiang. The PRC also uses this tactic across its entire territory, falling short of the proportionate aspect of the EU INTCEN. The 1.5 million detainees in Xinjiang are most assuredly not all radical extremists. China has, and will continue to, receive international criticism for its AI and facial recognition programs until the CCP creates a clear, well-defined, and precise program for its facial recognition software.